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CASHING OUT: HOW BIG PHARMA CONTINUES TO CAPITALIZE 
ON THE ANTITRUST LOOPHOLE CREATED IN FTC V. ACTAVIS 
Laura A. Gregory* 
The drug industry is one of the most lucrative in the United 
States. Drug manufacturers routinely find themselves thrust into 
patent infringement litigation against generic manufacturers who 
are motivated by high potential returns from the marketplace. In 
lieu of expensive and time-consuming litigation, brand and generic 
manufacturers will often enter into settlement agreements; 
however, these agreements are frequently wrought with 
anticompetitive effects−commonly known in the industry as 
“reverse payment settlements.” In 2013, the Supreme Court was 
asked to determine if reverse payment settlements were violations 
of antitrust law, but it only addressed one type of settlement, 
opening the door for continued antitrust violations and lower court 
confusion. This Recent Development will examine the different 
forms of reverse-payment settlements, the Supreme Court’s silence, 
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The increasing cost of prescription drugs in the United States 
has become a source of growing concern for patients, prescribers, 
payers, and policy makers.1 Because pricing is left to market 
competition, the United States has significantly higher drug prices 
than in “countries where governments directly or indirectly control 
medicine costs.”2 Although prices can vary widely around the 
world, U.S. drug prices per capita still substantially outpace those 
of nearly every other advanced country.3 In 2013, the United 
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1 Aaron Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of 
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 316 JAMA 858, 859 (2016) 
[hereinafter The High Cost of Prescription Drugs]. 
 2 Ben Hirschler, Exclusive—Transatlantic Divide: How U.S. Pays Three 
Times More for Drugs, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2015, 12:28 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pharmaceuticals-usa-comparison-
idUSKCN0S61KU20151012.  
 3 B.S. Quon, R. Firszt & M.J. Eisenberg, A Comparison of Brand-name Drug 
Prices Between Canadian-based Internet Pharmacies and Major US Drug 
Chain Pharmacies, 143(6) ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 397 (2005); see also 
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States’ “per capita spending on prescription drugs was $858 
compared with an average of $400 for nineteen [other] advanced 
industrialized nations.”4 “Between 2013 and 2015, net spending on 
prescription drugs increased approximately [twenty percent] in the 
United States, outpacing a forecast [eleven percent] increase in . . . 
health care expenditures.”5 Further, prices in the United States for 
top brand-name drugs increased 127 percent between 2008 and 
2014 alone.6 Not only have the prices of top drugs increased, they 
continue to be higher than prices in other industrialized nations, 
despite discount rates received by payers from drug 
manufacturers—which themselves are hard to quantify.7 For 
example, in the United States the estimated monthly discount price 
of the drug insulin glargine8 is $183.86 USD, compared to $67.00 
USD in Canada, $46.60 USD in France, and $60.90 USD in 
Germany.9 This obvious and alarming discrepancy in price 
differences has subjected the United States’ health care system to 
intense scrutiny from both industry professionals and outsiders.10 
                                                                                                         
Robert Langreth, Blacki Migliozzi & Ketaki Gokhale, The U.S. Pays a Lot More 
for Top Drugs Than Other Countries, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-drug-prices/ (discussing how even 
after the discounts that drug manufacturers give to various payers, list prices of 
drugs in the U.S. are still higher than those in other industrialized nations). 
 4 The High Cost of Prescription Drugs, supra note 1, at 859; see also 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Health at a Glance 
2015: OECD Indicators. Paris, France: OECD Publishing; 2015. 
 5 The High Cost of Prescription Drugs, supra note 1, at 859. 
 6 Hirschler, supra note 2, at 2. 
 7 Langreth, Migliozzi & Gokhale, supra note 3 (“A Merck spokeswoman said 
[Merck] doesn’t disclose the discounts [they give to insurers and pharmacy 
benefit managers] for competitive reasons . . . AbbVie said U.S . . . drug sales 
go through many channels with different levels of prices and rebates.”). 
 8 “Insulin glargine is used to treat type 1 diabetes” and is a “man-made 
version of human insulin” that “works by replacing the insulin that is normally 
produced by the body and by helping move sugar from the blood into other body 
tissues where it is used for energy . . . ”. See Insulin Glargine (rDNA origin) 
Injection, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., 2016, 
https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a600027.html. 
 9 See Langreth, Migliozzi & Gokhale, supra note 3. 
 10 E.g. Langreth, Migliozzi & Gokhale, supra note 3; The High Cost of 
Prescription Drugs, supra note 1, at 859; Panos Kanavos, Alessandra Ferrario 
	
110 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 107 
One of the primary market forces allowing drug companies to 
maintain high prices in the United States is laws protecting 
competition.11 This protective environment is comprised mainly of 
two legal structures: first, initial market exclusivity, granted 
through Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval of a new 
(or “pioneer”) drug,12 and second, patent exclusivity, afforded to 
drug manufacturers through the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.13 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act,14 commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, codifies the 
significant exclusivity period afforded to new drugs entering the 
marketplace.15 While the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to 
encourage innovation and drug price competition, it inadvertently 
created a loophole for drug manufacturers to stifle their generic 
competition.16 
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies can delay generic 
competition that lowers prices by agreeing to pay a generic 
competitor to withhold its competing product from the market for a 
                                                                                                         
Sotiros Vandoros & Gerard F. Anderson, Higher US Branded Drug Prices and 
Spending Compared to Other Countries May Stem Partly from Quick Uptake of 
New Drugs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 4, 753-61 (2013). 
 11 See Food and Drug Administration, 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (1992). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (contents and term of patent: provisional rights); 
see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (conditions for patentability: novelty and non-
obvious subject matter); Am. Jur. 2d, Patents §§ 69, 78, 79; C.J.S., Patents 
§§ 16, 28, 100. 
 14 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 
360cc; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271), as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 
2066 (2003) (collectively, the “Hatch Waxman Act”). 
 15 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The first company to submit an ANDA 
containing a Paragraph IV certification is commonly referred to as the “first 
filer”; later companies that submit an ANDA for the same drug are called 
“subsequent filers.” See also Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, 
The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 
585, 603 (2003). 
 16 See David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust 
Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321 (2000). 
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certain agreed-upon period of time.17 This agreement is known in 
the industry as either a reverse or a pay-for-delay settlement.18 
Agreements that guarantee compensation from the brand 
manufacturer to the generic manufacturer prohibit generic entry to 
the market, on average, by nearly seventeen months longer than 
agreements without these payments.19 Many of these agreements 
are still in effect, and they currently protect at least $20 billion in 
sales of brand-name pharmaceuticals from generic competition.20 
In fact, a 2009 Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) study 
determined that pay-for-delay agreements are estimated to cost 
American consumers $3.5 billion per year—equating to $35 billion 
over the next ten years.21 
When called upon to review the legality of reverse-payment 
settlements, the Supreme Court ruled in Federal Trade 
Commission v. Actavis, Inc. that cash-based “pay-for-delay” 
settlements constituted anti-trust law violations, but the Court was 
ominously silent on the issue of non-cash settlements.22 Further, 
the Actavis Court created a test in which the factors were largely 
                                                
 17 , Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions, 
An FTC Staff Study (2010), F.T.C., 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-
company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-
study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter Pay for Delay]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 This 17-month delay attributed to payments was calculated by comparing 
the sales-weighted average time between the date of the agreement’s execution 
and the date of generic entry for agreements with and without compensation to 
the generic. See id. 
 20 See id. at 11 n.7 (“[This] dollar amount represents the prior-year total sales 
of the brand-name pharmaceuticals that are currently covered by agreements 
with delay and compensation and thus indicates the order of magnitude of 
brand-name pharmaceutical sales for which generic competition [with lower 
prices] has likely been delayed.”). 
 21 See Jon Leibowitz, “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect 
Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion 
Solution) at 8 (June 23, 2009), F.T.C., 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf. 
 22  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2225-26 (2013). 
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based on monetary quantifications, leaving lower courts little to no 
guidance on how to decide the legality non-cash settlements in 
future cases.23 The Actavis Court’s troubling silence effectively 
allows drug manufacturers to continue eliminating generic 
competition, which in turn keeps drug prices high and burdens 
consumers.24 
This Recent Development will address the high costs of 
prescription drugs, antitrust violations of non-cash reverse 
settlements, and the problems created by the Supreme Court’s 
silence on non-cash settlements. Part I will briefly discuss the 
history of the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in the U.S., 
and will introduce the Hatch-Waxman Act and its structure, scope, 
and subsequent criticism throughout the pharmaceutical industry. 
Part II will address relevant antitrust laws, including the rule of 
reason that was employed by the Supreme Court in its Actavis 
opinion, and will illustrate the concept of a reverse-payment 
settlement. Part III will examine the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. by discussing what the 
Supreme Court correctly decided, and more pertinently, its 
controversial silence on non-cash settlements. Part IV will discuss 
subsequent district court cases that highlight the gaps in the Actavis 
ruling, how different circuit courts have interpreted Actavis and 
dealt with non-cash reverse settlements, and will also address the 
questions that still remain. 
I: INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND 
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
This section will brief the reader on the history and current 
state of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Part A will outline the 
history of the pharmaceutical industry in the United States, 
including the creation of the Food and Drug Administration and 
                                                
 23 The Court set forth a sliding scale approach to determine if a reverse-
payment settlement has anticompetitive effects and employed the terms “large” 
and “unjustified” as elements to consider when analyzing the anticompetitive 
effect of a payment- terms that are commonly associated with a quantitative 
monetary amount. Id. 
 24 The High Cost of Prescription Drugs, supra note 1, at 865. 
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subsequent Amendments. Part B will explain the most recent 
overhaul of the U.S pharmaceutical industry, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act of 1984, and its scope, relevant provisions, and criticisms. 
A. A Brief History of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Prior to 
1984 
The structure of the prescription drug industry in the United 
States has dramatically evolved over the course of the nation’s 
history. Before 1938, various federal statutes loosely regulated 
pharmaceutical products on the market.25 The first significant step 
towards consolidating a set of federal regulations for the drug 
industry occurred in 1938, when Congress enacted the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (“FDCA”).26 The FDCA 
established a premarket notification process27 by which 
manufacturers were required to submit data regarding the safety of 
a new drug before its entry to the consumer marketplace.28 
Manufacturers had to submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to 
demonstrate, through evidence of research and development, that 
the drug was safe for human consumption before the FDA would 
approve the drug for sale on the marketplace.29 The data submitted 
                                                
 25 See Biologics Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1903); see 
also Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
 26 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301-399f (2015)). 
 27 See Biologics Act of 1902, 728 (1903). 
 28 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1762-63 (“The 1938 Act’s premarket 
notification system . . . did not apply to drugs that were not ‘new drugs.’ 
Moreover, a manufacturer could decide for itself whether the ingredient(s) it was 
preparing to market enjoyed a sufficient reputation for safety that could 
withstand a claim by FDA that the drug was not ‘generally recognized as safe’ 
and therefore was ‘new.’ Consequently, a manufacturer could introduce a drug 
whose safety FDA had no opportunity to review. Furthermore, FDA’s authority 
over a product that was concededly a ‘new drug’ was formally limited to 
assessing whether the product was safe.”). 
 29 The NDA requirement for a new drug was one of the most significant 
changes by the FDCA to the process by which drugs were put on the market. It 
was a response to the infamous ‘Elixir Sulfanilamide’ disaster, in which over 
one hundred Tennessee residents were poisoned by the solvent diethylene glycol 
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in an NDA was kept confidential and could not be disclosed to or 
used by another drug manufacturer.30 Under the FDCA, the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) had a gatekeeping role in 
determining whether a drug was safe to be marketed, but there 
were several ways in which a manufacturer could circumvent these 
regulatory requirements.31 
In 1962, Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962,32 
which significantly strengthened the FDA’s regulatory authority.33 
These amendments created a more complex premarketing approval 
system, in which a drug manufacturer was required to submit its 
own preclinical and clinical data demonstrating the drug’s safety— 
and effectiveness—regardless of whether it was a new drug, and 
also had to wait for the FDA’s affirmative approval of the data.34 
These amendments gave the FDA an effective veto over the 
                                                                                                         
that a reckless producer incorporated in a new therapeutic potion without testing. 
Realizing that simply strengthening FDA’s ability to act against adulterated 
drugs would still leave the agency responding to evidence of harm rather than 
attempting to prevent it, Congress invented a new legal category— ‘new drugs’ 
which a manufacturer could not market without first notifying FDA and 
allowing it time to assess their safety. See David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive 
Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939); see also Richard A. 
Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1761-62 (1996). 
 30 See Ellen Flannery & Peter Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent 
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 275-76 (1985) (“The 
most significant difference in the 1938 Act from [the Hatch-Waxman Act] was 
that the data submitted in the DNA was confidential and could not be disclosed 
to or used by another manufacturer. This restriction prevented generic 
manufacturers from employing the information to bring similar or identical 
drugs to the market without incurring expensive initial start-up costs.”). 
 31 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996). 
 32 Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962). 
 33 Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
417, 420 (2011). 
 34 See Richard A. Merrill, supra note 31. 
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marketing of any drug it had reservations about.35 They also raised 
the standard that a new drug had to satisfy by explicitly directing 
the FDA to confirm not only the drug’s safety, but also its 
effectiveness.36 The effectiveness requirement dramatically 
expanded the scope of the new drug approval process.37 The 
lengthy FDA premarket approval process was substantially 
decreasing the effective life of a drug patent,38 thus discouraging 
pioneer companies’ incentives to innovate.39 Further, under the 
regulatory system created by the 1962 Amendments, an innovator 
would be required to undergo years of testing in order to 
demonstrate that its drug was safe and effective, thereby delaying 
commercialization of the drug and substantially reducing the 
period in which the innovator could benefit in the marketplace 
from its patent exclusivity.40 In an attempt to restore patent 
protection and encourage innovation, Congress passed the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,41 the 
landmark legislation commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
B. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
of 1984 (The Hatch-Waxman Act) 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
of 198442 (“the Hatch-Waxman Act” or “the H-W Act”) was 
                                                
 35 Id. at 1765. 
 36.Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent 
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 301 (1985). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman 
Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 588 (2003) 
(“Although not intended to do so, the 1962 Amendments resulted in a significant 
erosion of the term of exclusivity provided to pharmaceutical manufacturers 
under the patent laws.”). 
 41 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 
360cc; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271), as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 
2066 (2003) (collectively, the “Hatch Waxman Act”). 
 42 Id. 
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enacted by Congress as an attempt to balance two competing issues 
in the pharmaceutical industry: the interests of research-based 
pharmaceutical companies (“innovators” or “brand 
manufacturers”) and the interests of generic drug manufacturers 
(“generics”).43 The H-W Act was meticulously designed to 
simultaneously encourage innovators to continue investing in 
research and development of new drugs while also increasing 
generic drug competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace, 
thereby lowering prices of drugs and consumer costs.44 
To achieve the H-W Act’s first goal of increasing the 
availability of generic drugs on the marketplace to reduce prices 
and consumer costs, the H-W Act created a process by which drugs 
previously found to be safe and effective could avoid the lengthy 
NDA process.45 This shortcut is referred to as an Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (“ANDA”).46 The ANDA process was crucial to 
the H-W Act’s goal of establishing a viable method for generic 
drugs to enter the marketplace, because it substantially relaxed the 
testing requirements for generic manufacturers, allowing them to 
more affordably enter the market in less time.47 The H-W Act 
established the ANDA, a formalized and expedited system for 
approval of generic drug products, to ensure a competitive market 
and lower prices after a brand drug’s exclusivity period ended.48 
The statute implemented this system by permitting applicants to 
“file with the Secretary an abbreviated application for the approval 
of a new drug”49 and specified that such an abbreviated application 
need only make a few certifications with respect to the drug 
                                                
 43 Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
417, 417 (2011). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent 
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984. 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 274, 277 (1985). 
 46 21 C.F.R. § 314.2 (1992); see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 45, at 274, 
277. 
 47 Kelly, supra note 43, at 417. 
 48 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). 
 49 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (2012). 
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product.50 In this application, the applicant must demonstrate that 
the conditions of use recommended in the labeling for the new 
drug are the same as those for a drug already approved by the FDA 
as safe and effective.51 
The second of the H-W Act’s dual purposes was to encourage 
innovators to invest in research and development of new drugs.52 
Under the old regulatory system, the lengthy FDA premarket 
approval system substantially decreased the effective life of a drug 
patent, which also decreased its value.53 This decrease discouraged 
any incentive to innovate.54 The H-W Act attempted to remedy this 
devaluation of drug patents by providing that the FDA may not 
approve an ANDA until all patent protection and market 
exclusivity periods have expired.55 The H-W Act also provided for 
a brand manufacturer to extend its patent term for a brand-name 
drug if the FDA premarket approval process decreased the 
effective life of the patent.56 Under the Act, the term of an eligible 
patent is restored for a time equal to the “regulatory review period 
for the approved product.”57 
Despite the H-W Act’s attempts to alleviate competing issues 
between generic and brand manufacturers, the Act has been largely 
criticized across the pharmaceutical industry.58 On multiple 
                                                
 50 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i - viii) (2012); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim 
& Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed 
Approach for the Modern Era? 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 293, 
303 (2015). 
 51 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 52 Kelly, supra note 43, at 418. 
 53 Id.; see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 45, at 301. 
 54 Kelly, supra note 43, at 418; see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 45, at 
301. 
 55 Kelly, supra note 43, at 418. 
 56 Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: 
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590-91 (2003). 
 57 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2012). 
 58 See generally Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing 
Competing Interests or Survival of the Fittest? 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247 
(2002); Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How 
Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the 
Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. LEGIS. 21 (2002). 
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occasions, surrogates for both generic and branded pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have been critical of the effects and effectiveness of 
the Act, each arguing that the other had exploited specific 
provisions for its benefit and that timely introduction of lower cost 
drugs, or truly innovative research and development of new drug 
products, suffered as a result.59 
Perhaps the portion of the Hatch-Waxman Act that is most 
relevant—and controversial—to this discussion concerning the 
tensions between generic and brand manufacturers is the system 
that enabled the resolution of patent infringement disputes prior to 
the entry of generic competition.60 The FTC has asserted that the 
H-W Act’s terms have been abused by both branded and generic 
manufacturers, which have entered into settlements in lieu of 
litigation that the FTC regards as anticompetitive.61 Further, many 
generic manufacturers complain both that timely introduction of 
lower cost drugs and truly innovative research and development of 
new drug products have suffered as a result,62 particularly because 
                                                
 59 D. Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, The Hatch-Waxman Act: 
Prescriptions for Innovative and Inexpensive Medicines, 19 U. BALT. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 107, 108 (2011). 
 60 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 56, at 595. 
 61  Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions, An 
FTC Staff Study (2010), F.T.C., 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-
company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-
study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N]. 
 62 See, e.g., Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch Waxman Act and Its 
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD AND DRUG L. J. 187, 187 
(1999) (“For those who ask whether Hatch Waxman was a good deal or a bad 
deal for the research based pharmaceutical industry, the most learned response 
is: It was not a good deal, unless one believed that FDA was going to go forward 
with its plans to implement abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) 
through regulation. If one thought that was going to happen—and FDA was 
working on it—then Hatch Waxman probably was a good balance. If one did not 
think that would ever happen, Hatch Waxman probably was not a good balance, 
at least at the time.”); see also M. Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch 
Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 
Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171 (2009); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 
61; T. Chen, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch Waxman Reform, 
93 VA. L. REV. 459 (2007); D. Reiffin and M. Ward, “Branded Generics” As a 
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of companies’ utilization of reverse-payment settlements as a 
mechanism for obtaining market monopolies.63 
II: REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND ANTITRUST-LAW: 
APPLICATIONS TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
This section will outline the relevant basic principles of 
antitrust law that come into play with regards to reverse-payment 
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. Part A will explain the 
rule of reason and its use as a test for the anticompetitive nature of 
an agreement, and Part B will describe the mechanisms involved in 
a reverse-payment, or pay-for-delay, settlement. 
A. Antitrust Law and the Rule of Reason 
In the pharmaceutical world, antitrust laws are used to prohibit 
agreements among competitors in the drug industry that 
unreasonably restrain trade, a category made unlawful by Section 1 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act64 and subsequently by Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act.65 Antitrust laws specifically 
address “agreements” because: 
“[C]oncerted activity inherently is fraught with 
anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the 
independent centers of decision-making that competition 
assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more 
entities that previously pursued their own interests 
separately are combining to act as one for their common 
benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in 
                                                                                                         
Strategy to Limit Cannibalization of Pharmaceutical Markets, 
www.uta.edu/faculty/mikeward/ brandedgenerics.pdf (May 2005); Christopher 
Ponder, The Dubious Value of Hatch Waxman Exclusivity, 45 HOUSTON L. REV. 
555 (2008). 
 63 See Pay for Delay, supra note 17. 
 64 In pertinent part, section 1 forbids “[e]very contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). This language has been 
understood to be less inclusive than its literal terms: to be limited to the 
prohibition of agreements in “undue” or unreasonable restraints of trade. See 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). 
 65 Section 5 prohibits “unfair methods of competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
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which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the 
economic power moving in one particular direction. Of 
course, such mergings of resources may well lead to 
efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their 
anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny 
even in the absence of incipient monopoly.66 
In antitrust law, there are two general types of unreasonable 
agreements. The first type involves an agreement between parties 
that the parties will refrain from either competing in some 
important aspect of competition, such as price, quality, or 
innovation; competing in a particular product field; or competing 
at all.67 These agreements between potential competitors are 
referred to as horizontal agreements (or horizontal restraints) and 
are typically the most basic anticompetitive agreement68 in terms of 
consumer welfare.69 The second type of unreasonable agreement is 
a vertical agreement (or vertical restraint), which occurs between 
parties at different levels in the chain, production, or distribution. 
Examples of this type of relationship include agreements between 
a manufacturer and its supplier, a manufacturer and its wholesaler, 
                                                
 66 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69 (1984). 
 67 See Balto, supra note 16, at 327. 
 68 See id.; see also JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW §2A-
4: Elements of a Section 1 Violation—Agreement—Nature of the Agreement 
(2016) (“[H]orizontal agreements are among competitors and thus have 
substantial potential to restrict output and raise prices directly [and] they present 
greater antitrust concerns than other types of agreements . . . “). 
 69 The term “consumer welfare” is used frequently in antitrust law and was 
first promulgated through the writings of Professor Robert Bork in the mid-
1960s. It was later quoted by the Supreme Court and thus earned a spot in the 
commonplace vernacular of antitrust law. Bork drew on the legislative debates 
at the time of the Sherman Act’s enactment to argue at length that the intent of 
Congress was mainly to protect consumers from harm done by cartels while not 
undermining efficiency. He argued that Congress valued only “consumer 
welfare.” In The Antitrust Paradox, he summed up his historical research: “The 
Sherman Act was clearly presented and debated as a consumer welfare 
prescription.” For a detailed explanation of consumer welfare, see Gregory J. 
Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters, 79 ANTITRUST 
L. J. 713, 718-724 (2014). 
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a wholesaler and its retailer, or a retailer and its customer.70 In 
antitrust law, horizontal agreements are sometimes characterized as 
“illegal per se,” while vertical agreements must be analyzed using 
the “rule of reason.”71 
The “rule of reason” is a method of analysis applied to 
agreements whose competitive effects can only be evaluated by 
using specific facts of the nature of the business, the history of the 
agreement, and the reasons why it was imposed.72 This method is 
the antithesis of the per se approach, which is limited to certain 
categories of agreements that are so plainly anticompetitive, and 
lacking in redeeming virtue, that they are conclusively presumed to 
be illegal without any further inquiry into the precise harm that 
they have caused or their otherwise permissible justifications.73 
The rule of reason is regarded as the cornerstone of testing 
whether a practice restrains trade in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. The Supreme Court first utilized the rule of 
reason in its 1911 Standard Oil decision.74 Chief Justice White’s 
opinion for the Court contemplated a “standard [to resort] to for 
                                                
 70 See JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW § 4:1: VERTICAL 
AGREEMENTS (2016); see also, e.g., Bus. Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (explaining that restraints imposed by 
agreement between firms at different levels of distribution are vertical 
restraints); Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97 S. Ct. 
2549, 53 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1977); In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 
618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010); Miles Distrib., Inc. v. Specialty Const. Brands, 
Inc., 476 F.3d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Trade restraining agreements between 
firms at different levels of distribution, e.g., a wholesale supplier and a retail 
distributor, are deemed vertical restraints.”). 
 71 MILES, supra note 68. 
 72 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 
(holding that there are two complementary categories of antitrust analysis; in the 
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly 
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of industry is needed to establish their 
illegality, and thus such agreements are “illegal per se”; in the second category 
are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing 
facts peculiar to business, history of restraint, and reasons why it was imposed). 
 73 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Stifel, 
Nicolaus & Co. v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 578 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 74 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 1 (1911). 
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the purpose of determining whether the prohibitions contained in 
[the Sherman Act] had or had not in any given case been 
violated.”75 He drew from English common law treatment of 
contracts that were “unreasonably restrictive of competitive 
conditions” by their “nature or character” as illegal, concluded that 
Congress had intended “the standard of reason which had been 
applied at the common law,” and stated that “in every case where it 
is claimed that an act or acts are in violation of the Sherman Act 
the rule of reason, in the light of principles of law and public 
policy which the act embodies, must be applied.”76 Chief Justice 
White later provided a more comprehensive statement of the rule 
of reason;77 it has been expanded upon, and critiqued, by different 
justices over the subsequent years.78 The rule of reason test is 
particularly relevant to the pharmaceutical world, primarily 
because of its application to reverse-payment settlements in order 
to determine if the settlements are violations of antitrust laws. 
                                                
 75 Id. at 60. 
 76 Id. at 60, 66. 
 77 See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (holding 
that Section 1 prohibits only restraints “operated to the prejudice of the public 
interests by unduly restricting competition, or unduly restricting the due course 
of trade, or which, either because of their inherent nature or effect, or because of 
the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously injured trade . . . .”). 
 78 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 
(1978) (focusing the scope of the rule of reason on the “challenged restraint’s 
impact on competitive conditions”); N Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 
4 (1958) (distinguishing the basic aim of the Sherman Act to prohibit actions 
that unreasonably restrain competition from certain agreements that are, because 
of their very nature, inherently unreasonable per se); Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. 
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether the 
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. 
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar 
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for 
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all 
relevant facts.”). 
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B. Reverse-Payment Settlements: Paying for Delays 
Reverse payment settlements, also referred to in the 
pharmaceutical industry as “pay-for-delay” agreements, are 
frequently invoked in the drug industry between competing drug 
manufacturers.79 “Pay-for-delay” agreements can appear in a 
settlement of patent litigation between a brand-name manufacturer 
and a generic manufacturer.80 This type of litigation usually takes 
place within the framework for generic entry to the market, as 
established by the Hatch-Waxman Act.81 
Under the Hatch-Waxman framework,82 a generic manufacturer 
can try to put its generic drug on the market prior to the expiration 
of the brand drug’s patent,83 provided that the generic manufacturer 
follows the prescribed steps for early entry.84 This is a strategic 
move for a generic manufacturer, not only because it has the 
potential to save consumers billions of dollars and thus promote 
general consumer welfare, but more specifically, because of the 
incentives that the Hatch-Waxman Act created for the first generic 
manufacturer to enter the market after a brand-name drug is 
already on the market.85 Further, the FTC issued a study showing 
that generic drugs prevailed in 73% of the patent litigation 
                                                
 79 See Pay for Delay, supra note 17, at 1 (“[B]rand-name pharmaceutical 
companies can delay generic competition that lowers prices by agreeing to pay a 
generic competitor to hold its competing product off the market for a certain 
period of time.”). 
 80 Id at 3. 
 81 Id. at 3. 
 82 See supra Part I. 
 83 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61 (explaining the profit motives 
behind this strategy, the FTC estimated that about one year after market entry an 
average generic pharmaceutical product takes over ninety percent of the patent 
holder’s unit sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand 
product).  
 84 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012); see also Colleen Kelly, The Balance 
Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 
Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417 (2011). 
 85 Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
417, 424-25 (2011). 
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ultimately resolved by a court decision between 1992 and 2002,86 
thus, generic manufacturers have a substantial chance of winning 
against a brand manufacturer, providing even more incentives for 
generic market entry. 
Section 355(j)(1)87 of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that any 
person may file an ANDA for the approval of a generic version of 
a pioneer drug.88 This generic version can either be the “same” as 
the pioneer drug (with respect to active ingredient(s), route of 
administration, dosage form, strength, and conditions of use as 
recommended in the labeling) or “different” in one of the 
aforementioned aspects.89 In submitting an ANDA for a generic 
drug that is the “same” as a pioneer drug, a generic company is 
thus required to submit bioequivalence data90 that sufficiently 
demonstrates that its generic drug is as safe and effective as the 
original brand-name drug.91 
                                                
 86 See F.T.C, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, 
Exec. Summary at viii (July 2002) (This study covered the period through June 
2002; FTC began receiving patent settlement agreements in January 2004 
pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf; see also Pay 
for Delay, supra note 17. 
 87 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (2012) (“Any person may file with the Secretary an 
abbreviated application for the approval of a new drug.”). 
 88 See Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and 
Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 277 (1985). 
 89 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 88, at 277 (“The statute does not provide 
definitions for the terms ‘same’ and ‘different,’ so the FDA uses its 
administrative discretion to give context to these two terms. A new dosage form 
or new use, or a combination drug which has never before been marketed, will 
clearly be “different.” Other circumstances which will be sufficient to make a 
generic version different from the pioneer drug will depend upon a variety of 
scientific factors.”). 
 90 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012). Under 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(8)(B)(i) 
(2012), a drug is considered to be “bioequivalent” to a listed drug if “the rate 
and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference from 
the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the 
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental 
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses.” 
 91 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 88, at 279-80. 
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Specifically, the ANDA must demonstrate (1) that the 
conditions of use proposed for the generic drug have been 
previously approved for the pioneer drug; (2) that all active 
ingredients of the generic drug are the same as those of the pioneer 
drug; (3) that the strength, route of administration, and dosage 
form are equivalent in both drugs; (4) that the drug has the same 
active ingredients (its bioequivalence); and (5) that the labeling is 
the same, except in respect to the information about the 
manufacturer.92 Pursuant to this section, the FDA also created the 
“Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations,” commonly known as the Orange Book.93 The Orange 
Book is updated every thirty days with current information 
regarding newly approved drugs and revised patent information.94 
In addition to the drug product-related certification required of 
generic drug manufacturers in Title I of the H-W Act, the Act 
requires a legal certification95 regarding the status of the patents 
protecting the brand-name drug.96 In a generic manufacturer’s 
ANDA application, the manufacturers must file one of the 
following four certifications for each Orange Book patent listing 
covering a relevant pioneer drug: (1) that no patents currently 
exist; (2) that previous relevant patents have expired; (3) that the 
generic manufacturer would wait until any relevant patents expired 
to market their version; or (4) that any current patent is not valid or 
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new 
drug for which the application is submitted (known as a 
                                                
 92 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 88, at 278. 
 93 Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/; see also Kelly, supra note 85, at 
418. 
 94 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 88, at 293. 
 95  Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, (July 
2002), F.T.C., https:// 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-
patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf. 
 96 Id. 
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“Paragraph IV certification”).97 When the generic manufacturer 
seeks to market a generic equivalent of an innovator’s drug before 
the expiration of an Orange Book patent listing for the pioneer 
drug, the generic company submits a Paragraph IV certification.98 
Paragraph IV certifications come into play in reverse-payment 
agreements because they are the typical trigger for a brand 
manufacturer to file a patent infringement claim,99 which is the first 
step towards what may culminate in an agreement for a reverse-
payment settlement. 
Under the Act, the first generic manufacturer to file a 
Paragraph IV certification100 will be granted 180 days of generic 
marketing exclusivity—meaning that the FDA will not allow any 
other subsequent generic drugs to be marketed during this 180-day 
exclusivity period.101 In a Paragraph IV certification, a generic 
manufacturer certifies that its drug either (1) does not infringe the 
patent of the relevant brand-drug, or that (2) the relevant brand-
drug’s patents claims are invalid.102 A generic manufacturer must 
file a Paragraph IV certification with the FDA in order to seek 
approval to put its generic drug on the market before the brand-
drug’s patent has expired.103 In other words, a Paragraph IV 
                                                
 97 Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do 
We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era? 15 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 293, 303 (2015). 
 98 See id. (“To assist generic drug manufacturers in identifying patents that 
claimed the brand-name drug, or its uses, the FDA required brand-name 
manufacturers to list in the book of Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations—also known as the Orange Book—all relevant patents 
protecting their products.”). 
 99 See id. (“When a generic manufacturer makes a Paragraph IV certification, 
it is required to provide notice to the brand-name manufacturer.”). 
 100 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
 101 See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2012) (“Subject to subparagraph (D), if the 
application contains a certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) and is 
for a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an application containing 
such a certification, the application shall be made effective on the date that is 
180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including 
the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant.”). 
 102 See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
 103 Id. 
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certification is a generic manufacturer’s ticket to enter the market 
early. 
Once the brand-name manufacturer has received notice that the 
generic manufacturer has submitted a Paragraph IV certification 
with the FDA, the Act provides that the brand manufacturer (or 
whoever holds the patent—usually the manufacturer is also the 
patent holder) has forty-five days in which to file a patent 
infringement lawsuit, claiming that the generic drug infringes its 
patent claims.104 In theory, the two companies would then engage 
in patent litigation and would either reach a settlement in which the 
generic company would have to pay damages to the brand (if it 
was infringing the brand’s patent), or in the alternative, the 
litigation would go to trial for a determination of infringement.105 
The original goal of creating the Paragraph IV challenge process 
was to provide a mechanism through which generic manufacturers 
could challenge weak patents.106 However, many brand and generic 
manufacturers abuse the system by entering into closed-door 
settlement negotiations that divide the market for the drug, 
increasing their joint profits at the expense of consumers.107 These 
settlements are referred to as “reverse-payment” settlements, 
because of the nature of the payment flow: instead of the payment 
flowing from the alleged infringer (the generic) to the patent holder 
(the brand), the payment flow is reversed—the generic receives a 
benefit from the brand in return for their agreement to not enter the 
market.108 
                                                
 104 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012). 
 105 See generally § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers 
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . during the 
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 106 Patent strength is generally measured by the probability that it would be 
found valid and infringed upon if tested in court. See generally Joseph Farrell 
and Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents? 98 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 4, 
1347–1369 (2008). 
 107 See Keith M. Drake, Martha A. Starr & Thomas McGuire, Do “Reverse 
Payment” Settlements of Brand-Generic Patent Disputes in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Constitute an Anticompetitive Pay for Delay? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 20292, 2014).   
 108 See Balto, supra note 16, at 335. 
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A typical reverse-payment settlement takes a form similar to 
this:109 Company A is a manufacturer of Drug X, a brand-name 
drug, and its patent on Drug X still has a duration of ten years. 
Company B, a generic manufacturer, files a Paragraph IV 
certification in order to put its drug, Drug Z, on the market. Drug Z 
is a generic form of Drug X. After Company B files its ANDA and 
the accompanying Paragraph IV certification asserting that Drug Z 
is the bioequivalent of Drug X and that Drug X’s patent is either 
invalid or is not infringed by Drug Z, patent litigation would 
normally commence, with Company A bringing a patent 
infringement suit against Company B. However, in a situation 
involving a reverse-payment settlement, Company A would agree 
to drop its patent infringement suit against Company B, and would 
also agree to pay Company B $10,000,000 per year for the 
remaining term of A’s patent (ten years). In exchange, Company B 
would agree to refrain from bringing Drug Z to the market until the 
patent on Drug X had expired. In this scenario, Company B, the 
initial infringer, was awarded a significant amount of money, 
referred to as a “cash” reverse-payment settlement. 
The FTC, among other critics, has condemned reverse-payment 
settlements as anticompetitive and illegal under antitrust doctrines, 
asserting that the delay of new products hurts customers who could 
benefit from the lower market prices that generic drugs offer.110 In 
FTC v. Actavis,111 the Supreme Court ruled that cash reverse-
payment settlements between patent holders and generic 
manufacturers violate antitrust laws.112 However, the Court ignored 
the possibility that a settlement could be of non-monetary value, 
opening up a world of confusion for circuit courts. 
                                                
 109 But see Andrew E. Podgorny, Supporting the Rationale Behind the Hatch-
Waxman Act and Patent Law: How Reverse Payment Settlements Under FTC v. 
Actavis Can Be Procompetitive, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 423, 424-26 (2015) 
(arguing a contrary position to this Recent Development, but including a 
thoughtful and descriptive illustration of the reverse-payment settlement 
process, upon which this illustrative example is loosely based). 
 110 Balto, supra note 16, at 334. 
 111 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 112 Id. 
DEC 2017] FTC v. Actavis 129 
III: HINDSIGHT: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT LEFT OUT IN FTC 
V. ACTAVIS 
The story of the Actavis case involves a suspicious agreement 
between pharmaceutical companies, a contemporaneous case 
decided in a different circuit that used a different test, and, most 
importantly, a granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court—all of 
which will be detailed in Section III. This section will explain the 
facts leading up to the Actavis Case and the lower court’s 
treatment of the complaint. It will then highlight the circuit split 
that occurred around the same time as the Actavis case was first 
heard, and finally will detail the Supreme Court’s Holding in 
Actavis, including its troublesome silence regarding the legality 
non-cash reverse-payment settlements. 
A: Factual and Lower Circuit Background 
The factual background of Actavis is quite similar to the 
hypothetical scenario between Company A and Company B.113 In 
2003, respondent Solvay Pharmaceuticals (“Solvay”) obtained a 
patent for its approved brand-name drug, AndroGel.114 Later that 
year, respondents115 Actavis, Inc.116 (“Actavis”) and Paddock 
Laboratories, two different generic drug manufacturers, each filed 
an ANDA for their own generic drugs, each stipulated to be the 
bioequivalent of AndroGel.117 As part of the ANDA requirements, 
the respondents certified under Paragraph IV118 that Solvay’s patent 
was invalid and/or that its drugs did not infringe it.119 Solvay then 
                                                
 113 See supra Part II.B. 
 114 AndroGel is used to treat adult males who have low or no testosterone due 
to certain medical conditions. See ANDROGEL, https://www.androgel.com;  
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
 115 A fourth manufacturer and respondent, Par Pharmaceutical, did not file an 
ANDA of its own, but joined forces with Paddock, agreeing to share the patent 
litigation costs in return for a share of Paddock’s profit if its generic drug was 
approved. See Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2229. 
 116 Actavis, Inc. was incorporated as Watson Pharmaceuticals at the time it 
filed this ANDA. See id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
 119 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2224-25. 
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initiated patent infringement litigation against Actavis and 
Paddock.120 In the meantime, the FDA approved Actavis’s first-to-
file generic drug, but in 2006 the parties settled out of court.121 
Under the terms of the settlement Actavis agreed that it would not 
bring its generic to market until August 31, 2015, sixty-five 
months before Solvay’s patent expired and also that it would 
promote AndroGel to urologists.122 In return, Solvay agreed to pay 
millions of dollars to each generic—$12 million in total to 
Paddock; $60 million in total to Par; and an estimated $19–$30 
million annually, for nine years, to Actavis.123 The companies 
described these payments as compensation for other services the 
generics promised to perform, but the FTC contended the other 
services had little value.124 According to the FTC the true point of 
the payments was to compensate the generics for agreeing not to 
compete against AndroGel until 2015.125 
On January 29, 2009, the FTC filed suit against the settling 
parties, alleging that the respondents violated Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act126 by unlawfully agreeing “to share 
in Solvay’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and 
refrain from launching their low-cost generic products to compete 
with AndroGel for nine years” in their settlement agreement.127 The 
district court held that these allegations did not set forth an 
antitrust law violation.128 It accordingly dismissed the FTC’s 
complaint, and on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,129 stating 
that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a 
                                                
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See Complaint at 77, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 124  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. 
 125 See Complaint at 81–85, FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 126 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see generally FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 
U.S. 447 (1986) (“Section 5 encompass[es] . . . practices that violate the 
Sherman Act and other antitrust laws.”). 
 127 App. 29, Complaint ¶ 5. 
 128 See In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1379 
(N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 129 FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long 
as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the 
exclusionary potential of the patent.”130 
B: Circuit Splits 
Meanwhile, the Third Circuit diverged from the Eleventh 
Circuit shortly afterwards by refusing to adopt its “scope of the 
patent” rule.131 In its In re K-Dur132 decision (decided prior to the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari for Actavis), the Third Circuit 
favored the application of a “quick-look” rule of reason test (also 
favored by the FTC), based on the common-sense conclusion that 
“[a] payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic 
firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties 
entering the agreement . . . .”133 This “quick-look” rule of reason 
test assumed that the existence of a reverse payment settlement 
was prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint on trade.134 It 
also provides that an in-depth analysis, such as the “scope of the 
patent” test, is not necessary when a clear nexus exists between (a) 
an agreement from the patent holder to pay a generic manufacturer 
and (b) a benefit for the patent holder (to the economic detriment 
of consumers)—absent another legitimate purpose of the 
payment.135 
                                                
 130 Id. at 1312. 
 131 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig. 686 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 132 See id. 
 133 Andrx Pharm. Inc., v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
 134 The Third Circuit did clarify that a patent holder may attempt to rebut a 
plaintiff’s prima facie case of an unreasonable restraint of trade by showing that 
the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some 
pro-competitive benefit. See In re K-Dur Litigation, 686 F.3d at 223. 
 135 In re K-Dur Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3rd Cir. 2012) (“For example, a 
modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved generic manufacturer to avoid 
bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug might have an overall effect of 
increasing the amount of competition in the market . . . .”). 
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C: Certiorari and the “Sliding Scale” Test 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to FTC v. Actavis, in 
light of the circuit split below.136 The Court, in a 5-3 decision 
written by Justice Breyer, overturned the Eleventh Circuit’s no-
antitrust-violation ruling.137 However, even though the Court 
cautioned that this “unusual” type of agreement could have 
anticompetitive effects,138 it did not endorse a strict prohibition on 
reverse-payment settlements139 and declined to adopt the Third 
Circuit’s “quick-look” rule that the reverse payments are prima 
facie evidence of unreasonable restraints on trade.140 It also refused 
to endorse the Eleventh Circuit’s “scope of the patent” test.141 
Instead, the Supreme Court promulgated a new approach to 
assessing the anticompetitive nature of reverse-payment 
agreements: the sliding scale test.142 
The Court based its new approach on the holding from a 
previous Supreme Court case, which quoted a leading antitrust 
scholar: “[t]here is always something of a sliding scale in 
appraising reasonableness . . . [and] the quality of proof required 
                                                
 136 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013). 
 137 Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237. 
 138 Id. at 2231. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 2234-37; see also Michael F. Werno, More Questions Than 
Answers? The Uncertainties Surrounding Reverse-Payment Settlements in the 
Post-Actavis World, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 200, 206-07 (“[The Supreme 
Court] based its rejection of the scope of the patent test on ‘five sets of 
considerations.’ First, these payments have the ‘potential for genuine adverse 
effects on competition.’ Second, the anticompetitive effects may sometimes be 
unjustified even in light of any pro-competitive effects. Third, in cases where 
there is strong anticompetitive damage, the ’patentee likely possesses the power 
to bring that harm about in practice.’ Fourth, the Court believed that antitrust 
litigation is more efficient and ‘more feasible administratively than the Eleventh 
Circuit believed.’ The Court held that consideration of the payment in an 
antitrust action avoids ‘the need to litigate the patent’s validity (and also, any 
question of infringement).’ Finally, ‘the fact that a large, unjustified reverse 
payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling 
their lawsuits.’”). 
 142 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
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should vary with the circumstances.”143 The Actavis Court set forth 
the following test: 
In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, 
can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive 
effects . . . the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing 
about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its 
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation 
costs, its independence from other services for which it 
might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
convincing justification.144 
The Court thus refused to classify reverse-payment settlements 
as illegal per se and refused to be more specific on how lower 
courts should interpret its sliding scale test. Instead, it merely 
stated that it would “leave to the lower courts the structuring of the 
present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”145 Circuit courts have 
subsequently agreed that reverse-payment settlements in the form 
of cash are violations of antitrust laws,146 but due to the Supreme 
Court’s lack of any substantial guidance in Actavis, the issue of 
non-cash “pay-for-delay” agreements continue to perplex the 
circuit courts. 
IV: THE CURRENT CRISIS: HOW DIFFERENT CIRCUITS HAVE 
STRUGGLED TO APPLY THE “SLIDING SCALE” TEST TO NON-
CASH REVERSE SETTLEMENTS IN THE POST-ACTAVIS WORLD 
Following the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision, a new debate 
emerged: whether non-cash payments are unreasonable restraints 
                                                
 143 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (quoting P. Areeda, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507, p. 402 (1986)). 
 144 Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237. 
 145 Id. at 2238. 
 146 See, e.g., In re Actos End Payor Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 5610752, at 13 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 243 (D. 
Conn. 2015); In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4988410, at 19 (D.N.J. 
2014); Time Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, 52 F. Supp. 3d 705, 710 (E.D. Pa. 
2014); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 543 (D.N.J. 2014); In re 
Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014); In re Nexium 
(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013). 
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on trade.147 District courts now grapple with questions on how to 
value non-cash payments and whether they meet the vague “large 
and unjustified” standard in the sliding scale test.148 It is 
problematic when lower courts are left with interpretation 
questions following a Supreme Court ruling. In this instance, the 
Supreme Court’s silence on whether a non-cash payment 
constitutes an antitrust violation, coupled with the vague factors it 
gave for determining whether a settlement is anticompetitive, 
created an environment where circuit courts have to determine—on 
their own—what the Supreme Court really intended. This absence 
of a clear precedent has created tensions between circuits that have 
interpreted Actavis differently. This section will first explain the 
logistics behind a non-cash reverse-payment settlement in Part A 
and will highlight the different problems lower courts have 
encountered while attempting to determine the legality of these 
non-cash payments in Part B. 
A: What Is a Non-Cash Reverse-Settlement? 
The term “non-cash payment” may seem like an oxymoron on 
its face, but there are varieties of ways in which a brand patent 
holder can give some form of valuable consideration to a generic 
manufacturer in exchange for the generic manufacturer’s 
agreement to withhold bringing its product to market that do not 
involve a monetary exchange. The most commonly used non-cash 
payment is a no-authorized generic agreement (“No-AG” or “No-
AG agreement”).149 
                                                
 147 Robin A. van der Muelen & Rudi Julius, Cash or No Cash—That is No 
Longer the Question!, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE, 12 (2016), 
http://www.labaton.com/blog/upload/Chronicle-Article.pdf. 
 148 Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237. 
 149 See Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long Term 
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A No-AG involves the patent holder agreeing to not bring an 
authorized generic (or “AG”) product to market, so that the generic 
manufacturer’s drug can have exclusivity upon its (delayed) entry 
to the market.150 An authorized generic is chemically identical to its 
counterpart brand drug, but sold by the brand company or its 
representatives as a generic product under the same regulatory 
approval as the brand-name drug.151 Under a No-AG agreement, 
the brand manufacturer agrees not to launch its own authorized 
generic alternative when the first generic company begins to 
compete in exchange for the generic company delaying its entry.152 
While a first-to-file generic manufacturer is entitled to no 
generic competition during its 180-day exclusivity period, in the 
absence of a No-AG agreement, a brand manufacturer is legally 
allowed to market its own generic product (called an authorized 
generic) during that same 180-day period, creating competition for 
the generic manufacturer.153 However, if a No-AG agreement is 
created, the brand manufacturer will withhold from marketing its 
AG during the 180-day exclusivity period (or any other agreed-
upon period), leading to valuable returns for the generic 
manufacturer (because its generic drug would be the only generic 
on the market).154 
A non-cash payment such as a No-AG agreement can be harder 
to quantify because it is not a monetary amount, but it can also be 
                                                
 150 See In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation, 2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J. 
2014). Brief of the Federal Trade Commission as amicus curiae before the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, addressing the 
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 153 See Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 154 See In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J. 2014). 
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just as anticompetitive as a cash-based settlement.155 An FTC 
empirical study of the competitive effects of authorized generics 
found that when a brand company does not launch an authorized 
generic during the exclusivity period reserved for the first-filing 
generic manufacturer under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic 
company’s revenues are substantially increased, because 
consumers pay higher prices for the generic product.156 Clearly 
there is a substantial economic value attached to a No-AG 
agreement, and because of that characteristic, brand and generic 
manufacturers have increasingly attempted to include No-AG 
agreements as part of non-cash reverse-payment settlements.157 
B: Subsequent Circuit Struggles in the Post-Actavis World: 
Different circuit courts have attempted to transfer the vague 
Actavis sliding scale test to contemporary anticompetitive concerns 
in the post-Actavis era, with mixed success. Two such attempts 
occurred in the Third Circuit and the First Circuit in 2015158 and 
2016159 respectively, both of which are highlighted below to 
demonstrate the difficulties circuit courts face in applying the 
Actavis factors in a consistent, determinative manner. 
                                                





report-federal-trade-commission.pdf (“Because generics often are priced 
substantially below the price of brand-name drugs, even a few additional months 
without generic competition can significantly increase overall prescription drug 
costs.”). 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. (“[T]here is strong evidence that agreements not to compete with an 
authorized generic have become a way for brand-name companies to 
compensate generic competitors for delaying entry.”). 
 158 King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., v. Smithkline Beechman Co., 791 F.3d 
388 (3rd Cir. 2015). 
 159 In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation, No. 1402071, 15-1250, 2016 WL 
698077 (1st Cir. 2016). 
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1. Third Circuit 
A No-AG agreement was the exact type of settlement in 
dispute in King Drug Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. (“King 
Drug”),160 which forced the Third Circuit to consider whether a 
reverse-payment settlement constituted an antitrust violation where 
there was no monetary payment involved.161 The respondents, 
Smithkline Beecham (“GSK”)162 and Teva Pharmaceuticals 
Industries, Ltd., entered into a No-AG agreement after Teva 
challenged the validity and enforceability of GSK’s patent on 
lamotrigine, the active ingredient in GSK’s brand drug Lamictal.163 
GSK originally filed a patent infringement suit against Teva, but 
the two companies settled out of court in February 2005.164 Their 
settlement included Teva’s agreement to end its challenge to 
GSK’s patent in exchange for early entry into the market and 
GSK’s commitment not to produce its own AG version of Lamictal 
tablets until January 2009.165 The plaintiff, a direct purchaser of 
Lamictal from GSK called King Drug Co., brought suit against 
both companies, contending that their no-AG agreement qualified 
as a “reverse payment” under Actavis because it violated Section 1 
of the Sherman Act166 by conspiring to delay generic competition 
for Lamictal tablets, and it violated Section 2167 by conspiring to 
                                                
 160 King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d. 
 161 Id. 
 162 At the time it entered into the No-AG agreement with respondent Teva, 
Smithkline Beecham was doing business as GlaxoSmithKline, or “GSK.” See 
King Drug Co., 791 F.3d. 
 163 King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 393. 
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 166 A settlement in which the patentee drug manufacturer agrees to relinquish 
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market exclusivity under the Hatch–Waxman Act, when it represents an 
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Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2. 
 167 Id. 
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monopolize the lamotrigine tablet market.168 GSK and Teva moved 
to dismiss, countering that, under the Third Circuit’s decision in re 
K-Dur,169 only cash payments constitute actionable “reverse 
payments.”170 The district court granted GSK and Teva’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding the settlement was 
“not subject to antitrust scrutiny” under K–Dur,171 and that, “from a 
policy perspective, this settlement did introduce generic products 
onto the market sooner than what would have occurred had GSK’s 
patent not been challenged .”172 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, holding 
that No-AG agreements should be subject to antitrust scrutiny 
under the sliding scale test to determine whether a reverse payment 
settlement “could have an anticompetitive effect or, alternatively, 
whether it was reasonable compensation for litigation costs or the 
value of services.”173 In the opinion of the Third Circuit, an illegal 
“payment” for delay does not have to be cash-based.174 
Specifically, one potential non-cash way to pay off a generic-drug 
company is to remove competition from an authorized generic 
drug, thus allowing the generic to demand higher prices upon 
entry, just as was found in the agreement between GSK and 
                                                
 168 King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., v. Smithkline Beechman Co., 791 F.3d 
388, 398 (3rd Cir. 2015). 
 169 The Supreme Court later vacated K–Dur and remanded for reconsideration 
in light of Actavis. See Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co.,133 U.S. 2849, 
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 170 King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 398. 
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2012 WL 6725580, at 6 (D.N.J. 2012)). 
 172 Id. (quoting in re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-0995, 
2012 WL 6725580, at 7 (D.N.J. 2012)). 
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 174 Id. 
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Teva.175 The Third Circuit accordingly found that the Actavis 
holding should not be limited to reverse payments of cash where a 
“No-AG agreement . . . represents an unexplained large transfer of 
value from the patent holder to the alleged infringer.”176 
Acknowledging the limited guidance provided by Actavis, the 
Third Circuit noted that “the thrust of the [Supreme] Court’s 
reasoning [in Actavis was] not that it is problematic that money is 
used to effect an end to the patent challenge, but rather that the 
patentee leverages some part of its patent power (in Actavis, its 
supracompetitive profits) to cause anticompetitive harm—namely, 
elimination of the risk of competition.”177 
Most recently, the Supreme Court denied GSK’s petition for 
certiorari, which requested the highest court178 to finally address 
whether non-cash settlement agreements were included in the 
realm of the Actavis opinion.179 In its petition for certiorari, GSK 
stated: 
[The Supreme] Court’s review is necessary to resolve 
disagreement and confusion among the lower courts about 
the breadth and meaning of Actavis, and to correct the 
Third Circuit’s erroneous conclusion that traditional 
                                                
 175 Jeff Zalesin, FTC Puts No-Authorized-Generic Pharma Deals in 
Crosshairs, LAW360 (2016) http://www.law360.com/articles/778893/ftc-puts-
no-authorized-generic-pharma-deals-in-crosshairs. 
 176 King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., v. Smithkline Beechman Co., 791 F.3d 
388, 406 (3rd Cir. 2015). 
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 178 See Petition for certiorari, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. King Drug Co. of 
Florence, Inc., et al., 791 F.3d 388 (2016) (“[T]he Third Circuit’s ruling is 
indicative of the confusion that has permeated the lower courts faced with 
interpreting Actavis. Numerous courts within the First, Second, Third, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits have considered what constitutes a potentially improper 
‘reverse payment’ that is subject to antitrust review under Actavis, and those 
courts have adopted divergent tests and have reached conflicting results. Judges 
are asking for guidance, as are litigants. Those engaged in patent litigation need 
to know whether formerly routine settlement and licensing agreements are now 
at risk of being deemed antitrust violations.”). 
 179 Tony Dutra, No Second Look for Pay-For-Delay Drug Patent Settlements, 
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EDITION, Nov. 8, 2016. 
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licensing arrangements that Congress authorized to 
promote innovation can be attacked as anticompetitive 
under the antitrust laws. The Third Circuit is not alone in 
expanding Actavis well beyond its intended bounds and 
misinterpreting the decision such that little, if anything, 
remains of the patentee’s express power to license.180 
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district 
court, on the advice of an amicus curiae brief written by the Office 
of the Solicitor General181 which said that GSK and Teva’s actions 
were subject to the same level of scrutiny, the “rule of reason” that 
was applied in Actavis.182 While some optimists may view this as 
an indirect signal from the Supreme Court that non-cash 
settlements are violations of antitrust law, the ultimate decision lies 
once again with the district court, who will be again forced to act 
without any guiding precedence from the highest court, and its 
interpretation will likely be inconsistent with that of other district 
court’s past rulings, or even subsequent rulings on the issue.183 
2. First Circuit 
The First Circuit also attempted to address a dispute regarding 
a non-cash reverse payment settlement in the case in re Loestrin,184 
where it extrapolated on the uncertain meaning of the Actavis 
holding and corrected what it felt was an inaccurate district court 
holding. This effectively overturned the lower court’s ruling that 
Actavis did not apply to non-cash payments.185 
The dispute in Loestrin arose from two reverse payments made 
by a brand manufacturer, Warner Chilcott (“Warner”), to resolve 
litigation concerning its patent covering the oral contraceptive 
                                                
 180 See Petition for Certiorari, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. King Drug Co. of 
Florence, Inc., et al., 791 F.3d 388 (2016). 
 181 Brief for FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, SmithKline 
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Loestrin Fe.186 The first litigation arose when a generic 
manufacturer, Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson”), 
attempted to introduce a generic version of Loestrin Fe to the 
market through an ANDA filed in 2006.187 Warner brought suit 
against Watson for patent infringement.188 The two parties settled 
in January, agreeing that Watson would delay entry of its generic 
version of Loestrin Fe until January 22, 2014, in exchange for 
Warner agreeing to not market, supply, or license an AG version of 
Loestrin Fe during Watson’s 180-day generic exclusivity period.189 
Warner also agreed not to grant any licenses to any other generic 
manufacturers during those 180 days.190 
Almost immediately after Watson and Warner made their 
agreement, another manufacturer, Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(“Lupin”) also filed an ANDA to market a generic version of 
Loestrin Fe.191 A very similar no-AG agreement quickly arose 
between Warner and Lupin in October 2010.192 Two putative 
classes of plaintiffs subsequently brought antitrust claims alleging 
that the two settlement agreements were violations of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.193 The district court declined to extend Actavis to 
non-cash reverse payment settlements and granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, setting the decision up for immediate appeal.194 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit subsequently 
reversed and made several clarifications to the vague Actavis 
ruling.195 In its ruling, the First Circuit was quick to point out that 
the district court was mistaken in believing that Actavis involved 
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 189 In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 1402071, 15-1250, 2016 WL 
698077, at 545 (1st Cir. 2016). 
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142 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 107 
only cash payments.196 Further, it acknowledged that “the value of 
non-cash reverse payments may be much more difficult to compute 
than that of their cash counterparts,” but ultimately determined that 
complexity and difficulty of proof were not justifications for 
avoiding antitrust scrutiny.197 
C. Analyzing the Difficulties of Valuing Non-Cash Payments 
While the First and Third Circuits seem to agree that non-cash 
reverse payment settlements should be included in the prohibited 
class of settlements set forth by Actavis, the resulting questions 
facing district and circuit courts now include the most pertinent: 
how do plaintiffs sufficiently—and more importantly, 
successfully—plead a reverse payment case that does not involve a 
cash payment?198 Although it remains to be seen whether other 
appellate courts will follow the First and Third Circuit’s lead, it 
seems likely that pharmaceutical manufacturers will face increased 
exposure to significant liability from private antitrust plaintiffs 
claiming that the parties entered into noncash reverse payment 
settlements.199 
Not only are there difficulties in valuing non-cash agreements 
at the pleading stage, plaintiffs also may not have access to much, 
if any, information about certain settlement terms, particularly side 
agreements, which will further limits their discovery.200 Thus, 
valuing such deals becomes nearly impossible, especially at the 
pleading stage, which is a crucial hurdle to overcome in any 
litigation suit.201 Further, some pharmaceutical companies are not 
U.S. public companies and therefore are not required to report 
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deals they make with other companies.202 So, while a plaintiff (or a 
class of plaintiffs) may suspect that a secret side deal is the 
underlying, substantial part of a settlement agreement, unless it is 
first discovered by other means, such as an independent FTC 
investigation, these plaintiffs will not have access to the terms of 
those agreements and will be unable to adequately plead their 
value.203 This effectively limits their chances of success in court.204 
In several recent instances,205 district courts have agreed that 
Actavis applied to non-cash reverse payments, but nonetheless 
dismissed the cases because the plaintiffs did not adequately allege 
that the payments were “large” or “unjustified.”206 For example, in 
2016 the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
dismissed a class of indirect purchasers’ claims that Takata 
Pharmaceutical Company and its subsidiaries engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct to restrict generic entry of ACTOS and 
ACTOplus, drugs used to treat diabetes, through alleged pay-for-
delay agreements with five manufacturers (“the Takata 
settlements”).207 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege 
anticompetitive conduct under the rule of reason that would 
amount to the type of “large and unjustified” payment that would 
raise antitrust concerns under Actavis.208 In discussing the Takata 
settlements, the court concluded that even if the agreements were 
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considered payments, the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently prove 
to the court that the payments were “large” and “unjustified.”209 
The court stated that it required “[p]laintiffs [to] plausibly allege a 
factual basis for the court to reasonably estimate the value of the 
settlement terms.”210 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that 
the licensing terms in the settlements were of “substantial value” 
and worth “tens” and “hundreds of millions” of dollars, but did not 
provide any method of calculating the value of the licensing 
terms.211 Further, the court was not persuaded by plaintiffs’ 
argument that a valuation method was unnecessary simply because 
the payments were sufficiently large.212 
Clearly, many obstacles for challenging non-cash reverse 
payment settlements remain, lending to the conclusion that the 
Supreme Court ultimately failed its responsibility of providing 
clear precedence for circuit courts to follow in Actavis. Further, 
despite clear pleadings from courts, judges, and litigants, the 
Supreme Court has refused to clarify its position, causing further 
inconsistencies and confusion to permeate in the lower layers of 
the judicial system.213 
CONCLUSION 
Because brand-name drug patent owners are easily able to 
utilize the loophole created in the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Actavis, and because circuit and district courts are now faced with 
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the difficult task of determining which non-cash settlements meet 
the standard of an antitrust violation without any authority from the 
Supreme Court to help set forth that standard, the Supreme Court 
missed the mark by ignoring non-cash pay-for-delay reverse 
payment settlements in FTC v. Actavis. District courts and circuit 
courts alike have struggled in the post-Actavis world to apply the 
“large” and “unjustified” factors to increasingly complex 
agreements between major pharmaceutical companies, in which it 
is clear that the companies are benefitting to the detriment of the 
consumers, but there is not an easy cash trail to follow in order to 
prove an antitrust violation occurred. Drug prices affect the lives of 
virtually all American citizens at some point in their lifetime, and 
the Supreme Court has continuously—and erroneously—denied 
valuable opportunities to protect those citizens from the 
detrimental anticompetitive effects of non-cash reverse-payment 
settlements. 
 
